This paper provides a search model of bank loans in which it is costly for firms and banks to find each other. The negotiated loan interest rate must compensate both parties for their search costs. In the model, if the original interest rate is low enough, then an increase in the risk-free rate leads to an increase in the loan rate. But if the original interest rate is high enough, then an increase in the risk-free rate leads to a drop in the loan rate due to the impact on the present value of future profits. The model provides a rationale for the sluggish adjustment of the aggregate volume of bank loans. The main empirical puzzle relative to the model is why loan defaults increase after the end of a recession, even as demand for new loans is increasing.
"Big banks in recent months eased standards on small-business lending for the first time since late 2006, a Federal Reserve survey found, but customers of all sizes showed little appetite for loans with the economy slowing. ... Indeed, bankers insist that they are booking all the good loans they can find." Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2010.
I. Introduction
When a bank extends a loan to a borrower, they sign a contract. A rich literature has studied many aspects of bank lending in an effort to understand how the contractual terms are determined. Theories have been developed based on risk-sharing, costly state verification, screening, monitoring, managerial moral hazard, and credit rationing. Observed contracts are often much simpler than predicted by such theories, which helped stimulate interest in incomplete contracting models. There is also significant work (eg. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) ) on the firm's dynamic incentive to repay a bank loan that has already been extended. The surveys by Gorton and Winton (2003) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) provide valuable overviews of the extensive literature.
In this paper, the focus is on the impact of the logically prior problem: the borrower and the lender must first find each other. Because the bank loan market is decentralized, finding a new trading partner is neither free nor immediate. These up front costs must be reflected in the market equilibrium loan terms. But this creates complexity because it implies quasi-rents. Accordingly each loan that is actually observed must have been expected to provide at least enough positive profits to offset the upfront search costs.
Exactly how the quasi-rents are expected to be split will in turn affect the still earlier decisions of banks and firms to search.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine the effect of search on the bank loan market equilibrium. Most previous studies implicitly assume that the bank loan market is centralized and so there is no need to search. An important exception is Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) . They study an externality that arises when there is moral hazard and borrowers borrow from more than one bank. Fresh lending reduces the chances that a previous loan will be repaid. They focus on the impact of such further borrowing. Duffie and Manso (2007) and Duffie et al. (2009) analyze the effect of dynamic information revelation with search -'percolation'. They find that this can also create an interesting externality. In contrast the current paper assumes away such dynamic externality effects, instead the analysis highlights the role of loan search costs on loan terms. In particular, the current paper characterizes the steady state equilibrium interest rate, and the aggregate quantity of loans.
A basic bank loan search/negotiate model is presented. This model is in the spirit of Duffie et al. (2005) and which in turn draws on the economics search literature as in Diamond (1982) , Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Rogerson et al. (2005) . In the model banks and firms engage in costly search for each other. Once a partner has been found, loan terms must be negotiated. The lending relationship will endure unless the borrower is hit by a very bad shock. A very bad shock causes the firm to default on the bank loan and enter bankruptcy.
In a steady state equilibrium the flow of new matches must balance the flow of matches that are ending. This implies that the firm failure rate is a crucial determinant of the rate at which banks enter and the rate at which inactive firms start looking for a bank.
The loan terms are negotiated in a forward-looking manner. But the volume of loans can only adjust to a demand shock more slowly because it may take time to find a good match. Default shocks have an immediate impact on the volume of loans.
1 The equilibrium interest rate on loans reflect several forces. As usual loan default risk and the bank's opportunity cost of funds are important. Beyond these familiar effects, the loan rate also serves to split the present value of the expected surplus created by the loan.
This third effect means that loan interest rates can differ from traditional models.
In the model the impact of an increase in the risk-free rate depends on the level of current interest rates. If the original risk free rate is low enough then an increase, results in an increase in the bank loan rate. But if the risk free rate is high enough, then an 1 In reality default on a bank loan is not always so abrupt. Missing a payment can lead to renegotiations of the terms of the loan. Empirically non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, and charge-offs are highly correlated in the aggregate quarterly data.
increase reduces the bank loan rate. This may help explain why empirically the spread on a bank loan is not a simple monotonic function of the prime lending rate.
Suppose that more businesses start looking for a loan. The bank's bargaining position improves because it is easier for a bank to find an alternative borrower. Both in the model and empirically, the negotiated loan spreads are higher when demand is higher. However, looking does not mean finding immediately. Finding can take time. Thus there is no tight connection between the demand for loans at a moment in time, and the volume of loans at that same moment. Instead there is a lag.
When the loan failure rate is higher the interest rate on loans increase to reflect the extra risk of loss. The bank faces an extra expected cost of looking for new borrowers.
Empirically when charge-offs are high, banks tend to reduce their lending standards but charge a higher spread as befits the riskier environment.
As observed by Santos and Winton (2008) bank lending standards do change significantly over the business cycle. The standards tend to peak during recessions and fall back during recoveries. The lending standards can be viewed as a proxy for the bank's bargaining power.
2 A bank with a great deal of bargaining power can charge a high spread.
Consistent with this perspective, there is a strong positive correlation between the loan spreads and lending standards.
Much of the prior literature focuses on cross sectional differences across banks. The current paper focuses on aggregate fluctuations in loan volume and loan terms across time.
In the model the quantity of bank loans is adjusted both by extending new credit as well as by canceling existing credit. This distinctions is, of course well known. Dell 'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) observed that there is a great deal of reshuffling of credit between banks.
As a result there is more volatility at the individual bank level and more persistence in the volume of bank loans at the aggregate level. Craig and Haubrich (2006) make interesting comparisons between the bank loan market and the job market. Loans exhibit much less seasonality than do jobs.
Variation in bank lending over the business cycle has been studied by Santos and Winton (2008) and Santos and Winton (2010) . In contrast to the current paper's focus on aggregate fluctuations, they are more interested in cross sectional differences. In Santos and Winton (2008) the focus is on the rates charged to bank dependent borrowers relative to less dependent borrowers over the business cycle. Firms with access to public bond markets are less susceptible to exploitation by their bankers when the credit markets are soft. In Santos and Winton (2010) the focus is on the capital position of the banks extending the loans.
II. The Model
In the model there are banks and firms. The firms have real investment opportunities, but no money to make use of them. The banks have money but no direct access to real investment opportunities.
3 If the bank does not find a firm, then the money can be left on deposit with the Central Bank earning a risk-free rate of return, ρ. The number of banks is determined by free-entry, while the number of firms is fixed.
Time is continuous and denoted by t. The time horizon is infinite. The order of events is that searching for a business partner must come before the negotiations. So first the bank looks for a borrower, and at the same time the borrowers look for banks. When a borrower is matched to a bank, they bargain over the terms of the loan. If they agree, then a loan is extended and the money is put into production. Production produces revenue continuously from which the agreed interest is paid to the bank continuously.
This continues until something bad happens to the firm.
When something bad happens to the firm it is bankrupt and loan is defaulted. When a bankruptcy takes place, the bank replenishes capital from the owner. If it is profitable to do so, the bank looks for a new borrower. 
A. Matching Flows
The requirements for a steady state flow equilibrium are essentially the same as in any other search/matching model. There is a matching function that takes the current flows of firms and banks and creates matches. Since matches are mutually beneficial, matches result in deals. So the basic structure can be described before spelling out the details of the firm and the bank's Bellman equations.
Suppose that over a short period of time δt there are f δt firms that are looking for a loan, and bδt banks looking for borrowers. Since the transition rate for an unmatched firm is a, the total flow of firms getting a loan is af δt.
The matching function between firms and banks is µ = µ(f, b). Here µ is the number of matches. Accordingly µ = af . This function is assumed to be continuous, differentiable, with positive first and negative second derivatives, and have constant returns to scale.
It is conventional to define the 'tightness' of the bank loan market as θ = Let m(θ) denote the rate at which a bank that is looking for a borrower finds one.
The total loan flow is bm(θ). A loan requires both a lender and a borrower, so af = bm(θ).
As a result m = µ/b. The rate at which a bank finds a firm is,
The rate at which a firm finds a bank is
Assume that µ takes the Cobb-Douglas form, µ(b t , f t ) = m 0 b 1−α f α , where, m 0 > 0, and 0 < α < 1. Since m = µ/b,
At times it is more convenient to think about the mass of firms without a loan (f ), while at other times it is more convenient to think about the mass of firms that have a loan (l). Due to loan size being fixed, this is also the total mass of bank loans. Because the number of firms is fixed, it can be normalized to 1, and then write 1 = f + l.
The mass of loans evolves according to
The first term on the right hand side is the increase in loans that is due to previously unmatched firms finding a bank. The second term is the loss of loans due to bankruptcies at existing firms that had a loan.
Much of the analysis focuses on the steady state. In a steady state dlt dt = 0. Thus the steady state volume of loans must be
Condition 6 is the first key condition that is required for the analysis of a steady state equilibrium.
In the short run there may be many reasons not to be in the steady state. In that case 5 needs to be solved using a given initial condition, denoted by l(0) = l 0 . Using the initial condition, the solution of 5 is
Notice that if the initial condition is at the steady state, then the system stays there. The rate at which departures from the steady state vanish depends in a simple manner on the matching rate and the shock rate.
This subsection provides the steady state mass of loans. It also shows that if for some reason the mass of loans is not at the steady state value, then it gradually returns to the steady state. This depends on the fact that θ is kept constant by bank free entry.
In a more general setting, in which θ itself fluctuated, richer loan dynamics might be observed.
B. Firm Problem
A firm either has a lender or else it does not. If the firm does not have a lender, it can look for one, or it can decide not to bother looking. Looking is costly. Getting a suitable loan is beneficial since it permits production. Let V f u be the expected present value of a firm that is unmatched to a lender. Let V f m,t be the expected present value of a firm that is matched to a lender as of t.
Consider a short time interval δt. Over the short time interval δt the firm incurs a search cost ('hunt') of −hδt and gets a loan at rate aδt. If the firm does not search then a = 0. If the firm does search then a > 0. Because search is costly −h < 0. If a bank is found during δt then the firm can negotiate a loan and get V f m,t+δt . Or, the firm can keep looking and get V f u,t+δt . If no bank is found then the firm gets V f u,t+δt .
First consider an unmatched firm. The Bellman equation is,
This can be rewritten as
Take the limit as δt → 0, and drop the time subscripts,
If the firm is in a steady state,
There will be surplus to be split between a firm and a bank that are matched. The negotiation over loan terms are solved using generalized Nash bargaining. This means that the surplus will be captured. Accordingly V f m > V f u , and so
Next consider a matched firm. A matched firm borrows M from the bank which is immediately put into production, and agrees to pay ongoing interest rate r. As long as nothing bad happens to the firm, over a short time period δt the production generates a revenue flow of AM δt , and the firm uses the revenue to honor its loan agreement with the bank. With probability s ('shock') something very bad happens, and so the firm is bankrupt. Since bankruptcy is forever the firm gets zero from then on.
The derivation of the Bellman equation for a matched firm follows the same steps as for an unmatched firm. Thus,
At times it is useful to rewrite the flow conditions in present value form as,
C. Bank Problem A bank is in one of three conditions: inactive, unmatched and looking for a borrower, matched with a borrower. The present value of being an unmatched bank is denoted V bu .
The present value of being a bank that is matched with a borrower is V bm . Each bank has M dollars and will make either no loans or one loan to a firm. Any profits or losses are absorbed by the owner on an ongoing basis to maintain M . This gets rid of the need to keep track of the bank's capital position.
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Following the same procedure as for the firm, the bank's payoffs can be written in flow form. For an unmatched bank that is looking for a borrower, the Bellman equation is,
For a matched bank, the Bellman equation is,
The left hand side give the flow of gains to the bank according to the state. An unmatched bank with no borrower (state V bu ) is spending money to search, and leaving money on deposit earning the risk-free rate. With probability m this bank will transition from the current state to state V bm which gives a gain of V bm − V bu .
5 Since everyone is risk-neutral, keeping track of the gains or losses would not affect the inferences. All banks make the same decisions. It would simply add extra notation.
An inactive bank invests M at the risk-free rate. Thus the inactive bank has a present value of M .
A bank with a borrower (state V bm ) has the money loaned out to a firm. As long as nothing bad happens to the firm, the bank receives a flow of interest payments. However, if something bad happens to the firm (probability s), then both the principal and the interest are lost. The bank transitions back to state V bu .
The bank conditions can also be expressed in present value form
D. Free Entry of Banks
The next step is examine the aggregate willingness of banks to supply loans. This is determined by free entry. There are an infinite number of inactive banks that all deposit their money with the Federal Reserve earning the risk-free rate. An inactive bank may choose to become active by looking for a borrower. Since there are more potential banks than firms, free entry limits the number of banks. By free entry, any entry date must give the same expected payoff, and this value must be M , and so
Free entry together with the first flow conditions gives,
This says that the value of being a matched bank is given by the value of the capital plus the cost of search divided by the matching probability. Notice that the matching probability will adjust in order to maintain this condition.
From free entry and the second flow condition,
The using this condition together with (V bu = M ) and the first flow condition gives
This says that the probability of a match is in effect pinned down by the bank's entry decision.
Condition 22 is the second key condition that is required to solve for the steady state equilibrium. The number of banks, or equivalently the volume of bank loans is controlled by the entry decisions. Since m is a function of θ, 22 can also be viewed as a loan supply relationship between θ and r, r =
. This version of the loan supply curve in θ − r space has an intercept of
The slope is positive and the curve is concave, with the degree of concavity controlled by α. As α increases towards 1, the curve gets flatter.
Bank willingness to lend depends on the interest it expects to be able to earn. If r is greater, then more banks enter the loan market causing θ to increase. At times it may also be convenient to reexpress 22 as θ = ( Proposition 1 Assume that r(1 − s) − (ρ + s) > 0, so that there at least some banks that are trying to find borrowers. Then credit market tightness, θ is increasing in r, M , and
In the bank problem it is assumed that there are a suitable measure of infinitessimal banks, each of which are making a single loan. As long as nothing else is changed, the model could have banks with multiple loans. In that case it would still need to be assumed that the banks are infinitessimal, that there are no economies in search, bargaining, operations, etc. As long as such conditions are satisfied, nothing important changes in the equilibrium if banks have more capital and make more loans.
E. Bargaining
When there is a match, the two parties bargain over the terms of the loan. For simplicity the size of the loan is fixed at M . The only thing left to negotiate is the loan interest rate. The outcome of the bargaining depends on the relative bargaining strengths of the bank and the firm. A generalized Nash bargaining solution is assumed to hold.
The bank's bargaining power is denoted β, and the firm's bargaining power is (1 − β).
When a bank and a firm are matched they must agree on the terms of the loan, i.e.
the interest rate. In order for there to be anything to negotiate, both parties must agree to participate. The bank's participation constraint is
If this were not true, the bank could simply refuse to make the loan. Using 21, and the fact that V bu = M , this provides a lower bound on the interest rate, r ≥ s+ρ 1−s . This constraint shows that, quite naturally, the lower bound increases when the risk-free interest rate (ρ) increases, and also when the risk of bankruptcy (s) increases.
The firm's participation constraint is
Using 14 and 13, this provides an upper bound on the interest rate,
Accordingly any negotiated interest rate must satisfy
If the parameters are such that these cannot hold simultaneously then there is no mutually satisfactory negotiated loan deal that is feasible. In what follows it is assumed that the parameters satisfy this restriction. High productivity (A) and low risk-free rate (ρ), and low risk of bankruptcy (s) are helpful to making a mutually beneficial deal feasible.
Assume that bargaining satisfies the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The bank's bargaining power is denoted β. The bargaining problem is
In the model the size of the loan is taken to be exogenous. There are several plausible ways to endogenize the loan size. The easiest is to let it also be chosen by the Nash bargaining. In that case instead of one first order condition from the negotiation, there are two. This complicates the algebra without enough extra insight to be worth it.
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To solve this problem note that this problem assumes that the bargaining is a continuous process. In this case V bu and V f u reflect the payoff that would be obtainable by leaving the match. Clearly these do not depend on the value of r. Accordingly neither V bu nor V f u are functions of the current interest rate.
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The first order condition can be written as
Then using 20
6 An alternative approach is to allow the loan size to be pinned down by liquidity constrains in the manner of Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) . This is being examined in a separate paper. A key implication is that because search is costly, the search process can interact with the firm's liquidity. This can result in firms searching for a bank at first, but giving up after a while. They might no longer have enough liquidity even if they find a bank -a discouraged entrepreneur effect.
7 The first order condition is
Note that
and,
Using the firm's participation constraint, the negotiated interest rate on a loan is
This is the third key component need to compute the steady state equilibrium. The properties of this condition are collected as follows.
Proposition 2 The negotiated loan interest rate, r N , is increasing in A, h, m, β and decreasing in k. The effect of ρ is given by
and so it has the same sign as sm F − ρ 2 . The effect of an increase in the separation rate is given by
, which will be negative if k (1 + ρ) (ρ + mθ) (1 − β) > hmβρ, and positive in the reverse case. The impact of credit market tightness is
< 0, and
The more costly it is for the firm to search, the higher the interest rate that the bank can charge. The more costly it is for the bank to search, the lower the interest rate that the bank will be able to charge since everyone knows that the bank's implicit threat to walk away is less attractive.
It is interesting that the matching probabilities, the bargaining power, and the risk free rate all operate through the impact on the compensation for the bank's cost of search.
If it does not cost the bank anything to search, then the bank is able to claim all of
The impact of an increase in the separation rate depends on, among other things, the relative search costs of the two parties. If the bank's search cost (k) is high, then an increase in the separation rate tends to have a negative impact on the loan interest rate.
If the firm's search cost is high (h) then an increase in the separation rate tends to have a positive impact on the loan interest rate.
F. Steady State Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium is a solution for θ, r, l. Collecting the crucial conditions
The equivalent to setting loan supply equal to loan demand is to simultaneously solve 22 and 29 to find θ * . Hence,
. This equation is easily solved numerically when there are specific parameter values. If θ = 1/2 it also has a closed form solution.
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Consider plotting with θ on the x-axis, and r on the y-axis. Then the free entry (loan creation) condition is an increasing function that is concave down. The loan interest rate condition is a decreasing function that is convex. The intersection of these two curves solves for θ and r. Then the value of θ is substituted into the loan market steady state condition to get the steady state volume of loans.
With the notable exception of firm productivity (A) many of the parameters affect both the free entry condition and the loan interest rate condition. Thus the impact of
Clearly only the positive solution for θ makes economic sense. most shocks will depend on which of the curves is affected more strongly, and in which direction they move.
The traditional real business cycle models interpret cycles as shocks to productivity.
A recession is then a drop in A. That will result in a drop in θ, and a drop in r. The drop in θ will also translate into a drop in l since ∂l ∂θ > 0. A recovery is an increase in A.
This will have the reverse effects.
III. Numerical Example
Consider Then the bank loan creation/free entry curve is an increasing function with a small amount of curvature close to the origin. However it is actually fairly flat at about 0.13.
The loan interest rate is essentially a straight line with a negative slope. If A shifts around, there will be a great deal of movement in the tightness of the credit market, but almost no change in the rates charged on loans.
IV. Fresh Start Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is sometimes said to provide an insolvent borrower an escape from the debt burden in order to have a 'fresh start.' The borrower loses the assets, but is able to start again without any debt overhang. In contrast to terminal bankruptcy, is not stuck with a payoff of zero for ever after. The purpose of this subsection is to trace out the equilibrium impact of this extra benefit to a borrower in the case of a bad event.
The bank's problem is not changed. The bank still gets paid if and only if the borrower is solvent. The bank is only affected in equilibrium if the agreed upon interest rate is affected.
The firm's problem does change. The firm's flow payoff conditions are now
In the event of bankruptcy the firm gets to start again in state V f u . This shows up in the flow payoff when a loan is obtained. There is an extra term +s(V f u − V f m ).
The present value conditions are
The only change is to the expression for V f m .
Solving these simultaneously gives
The negotiation problem has the same structure as in the terminal bankruptcy problem.
The bargaining problem is
The bank's problem is unchanged, and so V bm − V bu is the same as before. The firm's participation constraint simplifies to
The denominator does differ from the terminal bankruptcy expression. However, in both cases the denominator is positive. Thus the critical issue is the numerator. The numerator is the same as in the terminal bankruptcy case. Since this is key for participation, it turns out that the upper bound on the interest rate is
This is exactly the same as the upper bound on the interest rate as in the terminal bankruptcy case. Using the same steps as for terminal bankruptcy, the next proposition is readily derived.
Proposition 3 The steady state equilibrium interest rate with fresh start bankruptcy
) is exactly the same as under terminal bankruptcy.
Since the bank's problem is unchanged, and the equilibrium interest rate is unchanged, so too is the overall bank loan market equilibrium.
V. Bank Loan Market Facts
The data is all aggregate quarterly US data. As described in the Appendix, the main source of the data is from the Federal Reserve. Lending standards and loan spreads data are from the Survey of Senior Loan Officers that is carried out by the Federal Reserve Board (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/). This is a survey of about 60 large domestic banks and 24 branches of foreign banks. Accordingly it is weighted towards the larger banks.
Some data series such as the total volume of business loans, have been collected from the start of 1947 (255 quarters). Other data series such as the number of new businesses formed are only available since the 1990s (67 quarters). All the data ends as of the 3rd quarter of 2010. For consistency with the macroeconomic literature the data is filtered using the usual Hodrick-Prescott filter. The use of the filter seems to reduce the volatility, but otherwise does not cause major changes to the inferences.
As illustrated in Figure 1 . the volume of business loans is strongly nonstationary. So it is first differenced before the usual Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied. 9 In the raw data two fact jump out. First, as expected business loans peak during recessions. Second, the decline persists even after the economy comes out of the recession. In other words, the volume of business loans lags the cycle. The average quarterly growth in business loans from April 1947 to July 2010 was 1.88% a bit below the 2.2% for all loans and leases. Figure 2 shows the typical loan rate spread above the bank's cost of funds. Like the total volume of loans, the spread peak during recessions. Unlike the volume of business loans, the spreads seem to start dropping earlier, perhaps even before the recession has fully ended. The lending standards behave similarly to the spreads as depicted in Figure   3 .
There are several closely related measures available for troubled loans. A commercial loan that worries the bank induce an addition to the loan loss reserve, or it can already be nonperforming, or finally the bank can take a charge-off. These stages of trouble are high correlated empirically, and it makes little difference for current purposes, which is used.
The charge-offs seem to be the most closely related to the search model, and so that is the focus here. However, in a more refined analysis, these three stages of loan trouble could be distinguished. The charge-offs are depicted in Figure 4 . The charge-offs help explain the total loan volume. In particular charge-offs seem to peak after a recession is already over. Similar patterns are found in the other measures of problem loans. Apparently this pattern does not depend too much on exactly how problem loans are measured. There are lingering effects of a recession on existing loans.
To examine whether there are significant dynamics, Table 1 reports the results from running an AR-1 model separately on each series. All of the series are highly autocorrelated even after being filtered. This differs from the individual bank level results reported by Craig and Haubrich (2006) . At the individual bank level they report much less autocorrelation.
To see whether there are cross lagged effects a VAR with one lag in each series was run. Many of the cross effects are reasonably small. Mostly they seem fairly easy to understand. Apart form the lagged own effects, the following cross effects were observed:
• DLoan: negative impact from lagged standards.
• Standards: positive effect from lagged spreads, negative effect from lagged DS&P 500.
• Spreads: nothing significant.
• Prime Rate: negative effect from lagged DLoans, positive effect from lagged demand.
• Demand: positive effect from lagged DLoans, negative effect from lagged prime rate, positive effect from lagged DS&P 500.
• DS&P 500: nothing significant.
• Charge-offs: positive effect from lagged spreads, fairly strong negative effect from lagged demand, positive effect from lagged non-performing loans.
• Non-performing: negative effect from lagged DLoans, positive effect from lagged spreads.
Individually each of the cross effects can be interpreted in terms of the search model.
But effect by effect verbal interpretations does not easily capture the consistency of explanations. Hence, these observations are recorded here, but not interpreted for now. Lending standards and loan spreads are highly positively correlated as illustrated in Figure   5 . Both are involved in clearing the loan market. They play a complementary role. If standards can be correctly interpreted as a measure of bank bargaining power, this is saying, quite reasonably, that when the bank has more bargaining power, it charges a higher mark-up. When there is an increase in the stock market (DS&P500) there is a reduction in the bank's bargaining power. When bank standards are high, loan demand is low.
Troubled loans do have rather strong correlations with other aspects of the market.
Many of these are independent of which measure of troubled loans is used. When there are more charge-offs, the volume of loans falls. This is almost mechanical. For this not to be true would require extra effort on the part of banks to very rapidly replace the failed loans. When charge-offs are high, the prime rate tends to be low. Presumably this reflects a policy response function by the Federal Reserve. When the economy is weak, charge-offs will tend to be high, and loan demand will tend to be low. When the economy is weak, the Federal Reserve will commonly try to reduce interest rates in an effort to stimulate the economy. This will show-up in the data as a low prime lending rate.
In the survey data the loan demand variable requires a bit of care. In a search model there is a distinction between many searchers and many matches. wild guess. Presumably it is higher for the firm than it is for the bank -at least for small firms.) The value of A must be bigger than the costs or else there will not be an interior loan solution. I guess 25% might be a number to start with. Most likely that will prove to be too high eventually.
VI. Implications for the Bank Loan Market
In the model each bank has the same amount of capital and is looking to make (or has made) a single bank loan. As long as there are constant returns to scale, no search economies, and each bank remains small relative to the market this is innocuous. Suppose that the government suddenly gave each operating bank an extra M dollars. Each bank would pass the extra cash back to the owner leaving the original loan market equilibrium unchanged.
Suppose that the government recognized this, and so passed a law forbidding an op- The implication is that within this kind of search model context, giving each bank extra cash would benefit the bank shareholders, lead to extra cash on deposit at the Federal Reserve, and leave the loan market equilibrium unchanged.
Suppose that the government wants to encourage banks to make more good loans.
Within the context of the model such a policy needs to focus on equation 22 and proposition 1. The natural place to focus is on k the cost of searching for borrowers. For example
The government could in effect provide a tax subsidy to cover those costs. That would increase the number of banks looking to place loans. Of course, proposition 2 warns that there are further equilibrium effects to consider. Decreasing the bank's search cost will also translate into a windfall for existing borrowers as the interest rates on existing loans will also tend to drop.
This highlights a general policy issue that goes well beyond the specifics of the current model. Attempts to change the quantities of loans are likely to have important implications for the terms of other existing loans. Exactly how this works out will depend on the specifics of a particular model. This creates a concern that the secondary effects can be quantitatively more significant, and much harder to predict, than the intended primary effect of a policy.
The bank loan literature (eg. Gorton and Winton (2003) , Freixas and Rochet (2008)) has paid a great deal of attention to both adverse selection and moral hazard in the loan making process, see Rajan (1995), and , Diamond (1991) . Acharya et al. (2010) consider the impact of aggregate risk. The search friction considered in this paper is complementary to the usual incentive effects as in Diamond (1984) , Rajan (1992) .
The potential importance of search is already suggested by the importance of distance in lending that was documented by Petersen and Rajan (2002) . Weil and Wasmer (2004) and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010) study DiamondMortensen-Pissarides style models models with two frictions, one in the financing, and the other in the labor market. In contrast to the current paper, their main interest is in the impact of a financial friction on the labor market. A stylized financing search friction is used to address puzzles about the job market.
The history of the Senior Loan Officer survey is described by Schreft and Owens (1991) .
The survey goes back to late 1964, and the questions asked have changed somewhat over the years. They observe that: credit standards and willingness to lend are very closely connected, banks are less willing to lend during recessions, the Loan Officers report increasing standards, but rarely report a lowering of standards. Lown and Morgan (2006) use a VAR analysis to show that credit standards as reported in the Senior Loan Officer survey dominates loan interest rates in terms of the ability to explain the variation in business loans outstanding, and overall output. It is well understood that loan contracts are multidimensional, and so in general 'tightening' could refer to adjustments on a variety of alternative loan contractual terms. Lown and Morgan (2006) suggest that 'tightening' and 'unwillingness to lend' be interpreted in terms of informational frictions.
VII. Conclusion
The analysis in this paper may provide a start on consideration of the corporate finance implications of search. But the lack of centralized loan markets is a broad topic, with many aspects that go far beyond the analysis in this paper. In each case the first listed data series is taken to be the main definition. The remaining series were extracted for use as robustness checks. 
